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Abstract 
We argue that the evolving preferences and power resources of large cross-border banks help explain 
the crucial political moves to European banking union. As they became larger and more European, the 
relative dependence of these banks on national regulators declined even as the dependence of states on 
these banks increased – resulting in a net rise in the structural power of large banks. These banks 
benefited from the supranationalization of supervision through reduced compliance costs and the 
effective opening of European markets. The political divergence in the interests of large international 
banks and small national ones eventually caused the German and the French governments’ change of 
position in intergovernmental bargaining. Once in place, banking union accelerated balance sheet 
consolidation to the benefit of large banks that took over their weaker competitors.   
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Introduction 
It was only a matter of time before the nascent European Banking Union framework would face its first 
major test. That reckoning came earlier than expected, in June 2017. The Venetian medium-sized lenders 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVI) and Veneto Banca as well as the Spanish Banco Popular were 
resolved after the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) deemed them ‘failing or likely to fail.’ In both 
cases, the resolution of these banks redounded to the benefit of large cross-border banks (Intesa Sanpaolo 
and Santander), which took over substantial parts of the business or even the whole entity. In contrast, 
the struggling Tuscan lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena has been nationalized. This outcome of the first 
real operation of the European Banking Union highlights its central political characteristic, which 
political scientists have until now underemphasized: the decisive role of large banks in the shift to 
banking union. 
The banking union framework resulted from a gradual shift in the interests of key actors and a crisis 
moment in 2012 that opened the way for the adoption of significant new institutions. Observers writing 
from different theoretical perspectives concur that the banking union became possible when Germany, 
the most powerful member-state in the eurozone, agreed to the adoption of a series of institutional 
measures to oversee bank functioning and possible resolution (Howarth and Quaglia 2013, 2014, 2016; 
Schimmelfennig 2015; Schäfer 2016; Glöckler, Lindner, and Salines 2017). This article makes a 
distinctive contribution to understanding the inception of the banking union and the downstream 
consequences of its design.  
Liberal intergovernmentalists tend to emphasize Germany’s change of position as a response to the 
possible costs of break-up of the eurozone (Schimmelfennig 2015), with German interests dictated by 
the structure of its particular banking sector, notably the network of politically influential private savings 
banks (Howarth and Quaglia 2014). Those scholars drawing on neo-functional theory emphasize how 
spillover dynamics stemming from the eurozone crisis strengthened supranational authorities, in 
particular, the European Central Bank and the Commission, and simultaneously weakened German 
reluctance to create a banking union (Epstein and Rhodes 2014, 2016, 2018; Niemann and Ioannou 
2015; De Rynck 2016; Nielsen and Smeets 2018). Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier (2016) even combine 
the two modes of explanation into what they characterize as a policy mode of ‘falling forward,’ in which 
lowest common denominator intergovernmental deals between powerful states give way to further neo-
functionally inspired pressures for integration, which in turn result in new, incomplete 
intergovernmental deals.    
It is clear that intergovernmental deals have been the normal modus operandi for banking union, as 
in previous stages of integration. It is likewise clear that the eurozone crisis created a strong set of 
functional pressures that enabled supranational actors to push integration forward. In this sense, we 
agree with accounts in the existing literature. However, these conventional stories are incomplete. Their 
theoretical focus, anchored in older debates about European integration, draws attention away from what 
we view as the most consequential changes that contributed to the emergence of banking union.  
As intergovernmental accounts have stressed, national governments are responsive to dominant 
interest coalitions. What we observe, however, is that the power resources of the different members of 
national coalitions in finance in key countries has changed over time, and as a result the sort of influence 
they wield over government has altered. A shift in power resources within a sector – such as finance – 
can lead to a shift in national preferences over interstate bargaining. That, we argue, was the decisive 
change that led to the adoption of the institutions of the banking union. Across Europe, the deepening 
of financial integration led to a break-up of the coalition among large and small banks, as large, cross-
border private banks based in the eurozone moved from a business model based on what Epstein (2014a) 
has called a regime of banking nationalism to one of banking Europeanism. This certainly does not mean 
that banks ceased to exercise influence at the national level. But the increasing market dominance and 
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international exposure of large banks changed their relationship with national regulators and with 
smaller banks in their home country. Mügge (2010) has shown that ‘competition politics’ can be a driver 
of institutional change, as large firms with cross-border operations push for the supranationalization of 
regulation to gain a competitive advantage over their domestic competitors. The euro area crisis did not 
change the preferences of large banks for supranationalizing regulation, but it provided an opening for 
them to deliver a deathblow to their smaller competitors.  
To elucidate this transformation within the financial coalition, we draw on the distinction between 
instrumental and structural power (Lindblom 1977; Culpepper 2015; Fairfield 2015). Instrumental 
power refers to the means, not necessarily related to business, through which firms exercise political 
power, such as lobbying and privileged access to senior policymakers. Structural power refers to the 
exercise of political influence by banks through their core economic functions as employers, investors, 
and providers of capital to the private sector (Culpepper and Reinke 2014; Young and Pagliari 2017). 
The euro area crisis has highlighted a neglected aspect of banks’ structural power as a provider of capital 
to sovereigns. By holding large amounts of domestic sovereign bonds on their balance sheets the fate of 
‘too big to fail’ banks and their sovereigns became closely intertwined. 
Over time, the structural power of large banks acting in the eurozone has overtaken the instrumental 
power exercised by coalitions of small and large banks at the national level. Having structural power 
does not mean large banks are all-powerful – far from it. What it means instead is that both national and 
European Union policymakers have shifted their emphasis from a strategy aimed at satisfying the 
expressed political demands of (often small) banks to a strategy that is consistent with the economic 
imperatives of large banks, partly because those imperatives have become closely intertwined with the 
economic well-being of states. We observe this concretely in the break-up of the German coalition 
between large and small banks, but it is also visible in the French government’s volte-face on the banking 
union, which was initially opposed to the banking union, but which later came around to support it in 
line with the preference of its systemically-important banks (Epstein and Rhodes 2016, 430; Epstein 
2014a). 
In the next section we summarize scholarship explaining the emergence of the banking union and 
show how the literature on power makes a distinctive theoretical contribution. We then show how the 
rising interest of large banks in pursuing banking union led to a conflict of interests between large and 
small banks, even as it increased the structural power of large banks. The interpretation of the sovereign-
bank nexus as a policy problem was in part a product of the increased structural power of large financial 
institutions in the Eurozone. The subsequent empirical section demonstrates how the general divergence 
of interests between large and small banks played out in the Spanish bank crisis, affecting the coalition 
among German banks, and how that reordering influenced the German position in intergovernmental 
bargaining. The final section reviews the first bank resolutions that have taken place in Italy and Spain 
within the banking union framework and shows how their outcome supports an argument that 
emphasizes the way in which large banks stand to gain from banking union.      
The Banking Union and Structural Power 
Conventional liberal intergovernmental (LI) theory derives national preference from the dominant 
interest coalition in countries, and the outcome of national bargaining to the power of states with the 
best negotiating leverage. Applying this model to the case of banking union, Schimmelfennig (2015, 
181) predicts ‘a common interest in the survival of the euro (area) based on perceptions of 
interdependence and potential net losses and conflicting preferences on the distribution of the burdens 
of adjustment depending on their fiscal position.’ LI theory predicts that euro area reforms will reflect 
the preferences of Germany, which was in a strong bargaining position due to its enhanced fiscal space 
(Schimmelfennig 2015, 188). 
Death in Veneto? European banking union and the structural power of large banks 
European University Institute 3 
Howarth and Quaglia have been at the forefront of recent scholarship on the evolution of the banking 
union, and their perspective too is fundamentally intergovernmentalist, deriving national preferences for 
the banking union based on the constraints of belonging to a currency union. They build on the work of 
Schoenmaker (2011), who argued that a financial trilemma exists because the three objectives of free 
capital movement, financial stability, and national financial supervision autonomy cannot be achieved 
simultaneously in a currency union. Howarth and Quaglia (2014) add euro membership as an additional 
building block to the financial dilemma. This ‘financial inconsistent quartet’ forms the basis of Howarth 
and Quaglia’s intellectual platform to explain national choices (Howarth and Quaglia 2014, 2016). Their 
conclusions broadly concur with those of Spendzharova (2014), who finds that low levels of foreign 
bank penetration combined with highly internationalized domestic banks favour supranational banking 
supervision, whereas states with high levels of foreign bank penetration and low domestic bank 
internationalization want to retain domestic regulatory capacity. 
These predictions from conventional LI theory run into two empirical puzzles. First, the outcome of 
the negotiations over the SSM and the SRM do not reflect the preferences of creditor countries to the 
extent one would have expected, given the LI prediction that fiscally sound countries such as Germany 
should determine the institutional outcome (Schäfer 2016). Indeed, Germany and other northern 
European countries created a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) that will be gradually mutualized over eight 
years. Schimmelfennig (2015, 192) concedes that his LI explanation does not account for large German 
concessions during the banking union legislative process. Second, the elegant accounts of Howarth and 
Quaglia fail to provide a convincing rationale for the shift of the German and the French position during 
2012. 
We argue that the 2012 agreement that jumpstarted the process towards a fully-fledged banking union 
results from the evolving preferences and power resources of systemically important large cross-border 
banks. Howarth and Quaglia (2014, 131) claim that  
‘German government concerns over the fate of the Sparkassen determined the contours of the 
banking union agreed between December 2012 and March 2014 and dictated the reach of ECB direct 
supervision, which ended up covering only one of the more than 420 savings banks’.  
We posit that what looks like a product of intergovernmental muddling through in response to small 
bank pressure in fact reflects the changing interests of large private banks. The ECB indirectly supervises 
all non-significant banks in the euro area and can take charge of supervision over any credit institution 
if it deems it necessary to do so. This ‘face-saving’ compromise allowed the German government to 
claim that it successfully defended the interests of its savings banks.  
We share with conventional LI analysis the perspective that domestic interest coalitions often play a 
decisive role in determining national positions. Where we propose a theoretical innovation to LI analysis 
is in not equating national positions with national bank structure (which is generally stable over time), 
but instead in locating the taking of national positions in a dynamic process of interest representation. 
Following Epstein (2014a), we contend that it was the changing orientations, loyalties, and business 
strategies of large banks that eased the path to a European banking union. By promoting national bank 
champions through banking nationalism (Véron 2015), especially in the larger member states, the largest 
banks in the eurozone became ‘too big to fail’. As the revenue base of these banks in their home countries 
shrank in relative terms, their loyalty towards their national supervisors decreased in equal measure. At 
the same time, this growth put their future policy preferences in direct conflict with those of their 
erstwhile small banking allies. Large cross-border banks benefit from the supranationalization of 
supervision through reduced compliance costs related to idiosyncratic capital and liquidity requirements 
that previously tied up resources and through takeovers of weaker competitors. In contrast, (mainly 
small) banks operating in a single national environment expected neither cost saving nor competitive 
advantage from centralized supervision (Hennessy 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2013; Epstein 2014a). 
The distinction between structural and instrumental power provides a useful way to summarize the 
salient political consequences of the expansion of ‘too big to fail’ banks. Banks such as Deutsche Bank 
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increased so drastically Germany became simply one market among others for them. By 2007, Deutsche 
Bank generated only 27 percent of its revenue within Germany (Culpepper and Reinke 2014). This 
reduced dependence on the German market enabled Deutsche to defy German regulators with impunity. 
This represents an increase in their structural power, because it is bargaining power that results entirely 
from their economic profile. The increased structural power accruing to Deutsche Bank contrasts with 
more conventional strategies of influence peddling and lobbying – which are known as instrumental 
power – because that lobbying depends on the resources expended to exert influence, rather than on 
economic structural change alone (Culpepper 2015).  
Small bank networks, which depend on political protection through instrumental power, witnessed 
the decrease of their structural power in recent years. The number of employees of the savings banks 
alone has declined from 251.400 in 2008 to 224.671 in 2016, and their market share by business volume 
in Germany dropped was 16.8% at the end of 2016, slightly below the 18.5% of big banks (Savings 
Banks Finance Group 2017, 33). While they often lobby together with large banks on issues of common 
concern, small banks – such as the German savings and cooperative banks – are highly dependent on 
their relationship with regulators. This relationship is their sole protection against adverse regulation – 
one that they were not shy to draw upon once banking union was put on the political agenda. This 
explains why these banks fought adamantly to safeguard the involvement of the national authorities in 
the supervision of small banks (Steen, Wilson, and Barker 2012). Georg Fahrenschon, former head of 
the politically powerful German savings banks association, mobilized immediately against plans for a 
European deposit insurance scheme through inside lobbying, for which he could draw on close ties to 
local politicians who often sit on the supervisory board of savings banks. In their lobbying effort, the 
savings banks benefit from their ability to ‘portray themselves […] as small and systemically irrelevant 
where it suits – but enjoy large benefits from being considered in other circumstances as part of large, 
closely linked network. “Sometimes they are one of the biggest financial groups in the world and 
sometimes they are just 400 simple little banks”’ (Wilson, Wiesmann, and Barker 2012). Thus, the 
savings and cooperative bank’s instrumental power was effectively deployed in the short run to obstruct 
the creation of eurozone-wide deposit scheme and ensure the involvement of the national supervisory 
authorities. At the time of writing, a European Deposit Insurance Scheme has still not been implemented 
(Donnelly 2018).  
As the interests of large banks in banking union grew and their structural power was bolstered by the 
sovereign-bank nexus, this divergence in the position of large international banks and small national 
ones eventually caused a rupture in the German banking coalition. It is this rupture, we maintain, that 
partially accounts for the German change of position during intergovernmental bargaining in 2012. The 
Spanish bank crisis created a window of opportunity for large banks within Germany to undermine the 
narrative of the powerful German savings banks and to impose further costs on them, which then paved 
the way towards banking union. Similarly, the French government aligned its position on banking union 
with that of its large systemically-important banks. We acknowledge that the high politics quid-pro-quo 
(SSM in exchange for ESM direct bank recapitalization) was decisive for the shift towards banking 
union. However, we maintain that this outcome would have been unattainable in the absence of the 
relative empowerment of large cross-border banks.    
The Interests of Large Banks in Banking Union: Competitive Advantage, Regulatory 
Savings 
Large banks compete both in an international market, against other large banks, and in a home market, 
against other small banks. Centralized banking supervision and resolution – which lies at the core of 
European banking union – helps the strongest large banks on both these fronts. Internationally, it 
provides incentives for the further consolidation of large banks by creating a single set of supervisory 
practices that will make it more difficult for national governments to protect weak banks from market 
pressures. At the same time, the existence of a single set of rules provides a further weapon for large 
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banks to use in their long-running fight against what they view as the politically protected position of 
small cooperative and savings banks (Lütz 2005). The latter banks, which are well-connected in 
domestic politics, lose influence when the question of banking supervision shifts to the European level. 
By serving these two objectives, the banking union kills two birds with one stone for the eurozone’s 
strongest big banks. 
Thus, banking union should be understood as ‘competition politics’ (Mügge 2010, 25) because more 
stringent supervision will inevitably crowd the weakest players out of the market, making them more 
susceptible to takeover. The take-over of Banco Popular by Santander and the partial take-over of BPVI 
and Veneto Banca by Intesa Sanpaolo are cases-in-point. As large cross-border banks benefit from bank 
consolidation through an increased market share, their smaller competitors are ultimately left without 
political protection. A first wave of competitive consolidation took place under the rubric of banking 
nationalism (Véron 2015, 39). Notable attempts at cross-border mergers, such as by the Spanish BBVA 
of the Italian UniCredit, failed due to the intervention of domestic regulators (Vives 2001). If banking 
union significantly transformed the ownership structure of large banks, this would introduce an 
additional element of cross-border risk-sharing into EMU and, thereby, enhance resilience towards 
idiosyncratic financial shocks. 
‘The installation of supranational bodies is therefore more than just adding an extra layer of 
governance that otherwise leaves patterns of governance unaltered. It is the formalization of political 
authority at a level of aggregation that matches the interests and market structures subject to these 
institutions. It is, in short, a transnationalisation of the state in the face of altered competitive 
dynamics in the market place’ (Mügge 2010, 27).  
In a regime of decentralized banking supervision, national regulators can distort competition either 
because the rules are not uniform or because uniform rules are interpreted or implemented differently 
across countries, as banking organizations have repeatedly pointed out to regulators (European Financial 
Services Round Table 2013, 13; Deutsche Bank Research 2000, 4; UniCredit Group 2009). In addition, 
competition can be adversely affected because regulators react at varying speeds or because regulations 
enter into force with a considerable time lag. ‘Competitive neutrality’ – the elimination of regulatory 
arbitrage based on the principle of ‘same risk, same regulation’ – has long been a prime concern among 
large cross-border banks (Deutsche Bank Research 2001, 2). The single supervisory mechanism of the 
banking union is more likely to achieve a level playing field than would a fragmented supervisory 
system. Thus, it further limits a state’s capacity to shield its savings and cooperative banks from 
unwanted liberalization (Deeg and Donnelly 2016).    
In the scramble for capital to satisfy the more stringent requirements entailed by banking union, the 
strongest large banking groups enjoy a clear comparative advantage over their weaker competitors. The 
head of the large French bank BNP Paribas, Jean-Laurent Bonnafé, revealed the strategic interest behind 
the banking union project. When asked about its consolidation effects, he replied that  
‘the strongest part of the banking system could be part of some form of consolidation — either 
through an acquisition or through organic development plans. In the end, consolidation will just take 
out the weaker players who were unable to strengthen their positions either because of their own 
situation or because of their jurisdiction’ (Fildes 2013).  
From now on the SSM will be in charge of granting and withdrawing bank licenses and will also be in 
charge of mergers and acquisitions. Banks with expansionary ambitions therefore stand to gain from 
banking union. Emilio Botín, former chairman of Santander, opined that ‘banking union is an ambitious, 
complex and difficult process, both operationally and politically, but we cannot afford to postpone it’ 
(Botín 2012). He pleaded for a maximum harmonization of regulatory rules and standards, the creation 
of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) and establishing a Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM). Five years later his daughter and successor Ana Botín declared, after having snatched up Banco 
Popular for a symbolic €1, that this deal is ‘good for Spain and good for Europe’ (Buck 2017). 
Santander’s domestic rival BBVA also strongly supported a fully-fledged banking union (BBVA 
Research 2013, 2014).    
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Large banks had long lamented that the liquidity controls imposed on foreign branches by the host 
country’s supervisory entity contradicted the principle of home country supervision, because it often 
served as a pretext for the host supervisor to extend de facto surveillance (Deutsche Bank Research 
2000, 6; European Financial Services Round Table 2013, 4). Another oft-used strategy by host 
supervisors was to demand that the foreign bank sets up an independent subsidiary, which would then 
fall under its own supervisory remit (Association for Financial Markets in Europe 2013). In this way the 
supervisor could effectively ‘quarantine’ the subsidiary of a foreign bank from any contagious effects 
caused by failure of its parent company. More importantly, it empowered itself to prevent the 
recapitalization of a parent company by its subsidiary (as attempted by Santander UK in May 2012) 
through ring-fencing the funds (Donnelly 2014, 995). 
Prior to the banking union, large banking groups were not in the position to reap the full benefits of 
cross-border expansion due to national variations in capital and liquidity requirements. For example, the 
Financial Times reported that a Single Supervisory Mechanism would free up €7bn of capital for Italian 
UniCredit from its German subsidiary HVB. The ring-fencing measure by the German competent 
supervisory authority requiring UniCredit to hold an additional capital buffer was grounded in a lack of 
trust (Mackintosh, Ross, and Sanderson 2013). Thus, it is not surprising that UniCredit’s chief economist 
strongly supported the banking union (Nielsen 2012). Austrian banks with operations in central and 
Eastern Europe faced a similar problem from the national regulator, which imposed lending targets on 
these banks (Epstein 2014b). Instead of relying on traditional capital controls during periods of intense 
financial stress, regulators often overreacted with macro-prudential oversight or restrictions on the 
operation of foreign banks (BBVA Research 2013, 2014). 
The harmonization of banking supervision entailed by the banking union was therefore expected to 
liberate excess capital for banks with substantial cross-border operations (Jenkins 2012). The additional 
capital could then be moved from over-capitalized to less well-capitalized markets, thereby improving 
a bank’s overall capital efficiency. Moreover, working under the surveillance of national regulators 
created pressures on capital allocation, either from lending targets imposed by a national supervisor 
during periods of stagnant growth or due to implicit pressures to stock up on the home country’s 
sovereign bonds. In short, the move to a Single Supervisory Mechanism meant that capital that had 
previously been tied up could flow into higher yielding activities (Epstein 2014a, 5). 
Even as it removed regulatory impediments to reaping economies of scale, the move to banking 
union also offered big banks a regulatory means to establish a level playing field that would allow them 
finally to crack down on the business model of the cooperative and savings banks. Already in the early 
1990s, the German association of private banks (BDB) tried to limit the competitive advantage of the 
latter. When they failed to resolve the issue at the national level, they turned to the European 
Commission for additional support (Smith 2001, 529). In 1999 large European banks attacked the 
business model of the German Sparkassen and Landesbanken by filing a case with DG COMP in which 
they alleged unfair state aid (Grossman 2006; Smith 2001). The banking lobby group, the European 
Banking Federation (EBF), took issue with the fact that the Sparkassen benefited from public guarantees. 
The EBF argued that this special treatment led to a distorted competition, because Sparkassen were able 
to refinance themselves more cheaply than other banks that were not backed by an implicit state 
guarantee. The conflict ended in 2005 with a first victory of the large private banks. The agreement 
between the German government and the Commission phased out local and state government guarantees 
by 2015 for Sparkassen and Landesbanken that were teetering on the brink of insolvency (Deeg and 
Donnelly 2016, 592). 
Despite this defeat, during the negotiations of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) in 2005, 
the German cooperative and savings banks succeeded in achieving a zero risk-weighting for the 
treatment of intra-group exposure, which allowed them to operate with lower capital requirements than 
other competitors (Christopoulos and Quaglia 2009, 187). The IMF has argued that this special treatment 
might lead to ‘a de facto underestimation of capital requirements’ and could encourage excessive risk-
taking that might endanger financial stability (IMF 2011, 11). Unless specifically required by the 
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national supervisory authority, savings and cooperative banks remain exempted from the statutory 
national deposit insurance scheme (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, 150). However, a harmonization of the 
various German deposit insurance schemes has thus far been prevented through the use of instrumental 
power facilitated by the ‘unwavering support of German politicians’ (Deeg and Donnelly 2016, 587).  
Structural Power at the Heart of the Sovereign-Bank Nexus 
The logic of the sovereign-bank nexus posits that any failure of a large cross-border bank in any euro 
area country could set in motion a doom loop that would eventually drive a country into default, because 
the failing bank’s balance sheet might hold a multiple of assets in comparison to the country’s GDP 
(IMF 2013). The breaking of the nexus became the overarching goal that justified the move towards 
banking union and the yardstick against which to measure its success. The positive correlation between 
sovereign and bank funding costs reflected the so-called ‘home bias’, which describes the large exposure 
of banks to the sovereign debt of their home country. Arguably, this was the main driver of the negative 
feedback loop between rising borrowing costs of sovereigns and their banks.  
As such, the sovereign-bank nexus that emerged in the sovereign debt crisis is the clearest expression 
of the newly reinforced structural power of the eurozone’s large cross-border banks. By holding large 
amounts of their home country’s sovereign debts on their balance sheets, large banks intertwined their 
interests with that of the government, effectively insuring themselves against resolution. Large banks 
did not have to say anything to remind governments of their shared interests; merely watching the moves 
of markets made such a link manifest. During the height of the Spanish banking crisis in 2012 when 
peripheral sovereigns and banks saw their funding costs move in lockstep, governmental room for 
maneuver was hamstrung by these structural conditions. Earlier attempts by the ECB in December 2011 
to sever the sovereign-bank nexus with its two Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) had failed 
because large cross-border banks used the cheap liquidity for what some termed ‘the greatest carry-trade 
ever made’. Instead of lending the money to the real economy, the banks used the cheap liquidity to buy 
more high yielding sovereign bonds, which turned a nice profit for them but only provided temporary 
relief for the distressed sovereign bond markets.  
Moreover, the banking union had an additional noteworthy feature that appealed to both large banks 
and member-state governments: it redefined the denominator of ‘too big to fail’ by moving the issue of 
bailouts to the eurozone level. During the financial crisis, many large banks had been deemed ‘too big 
to fail’. Thus, the size of the balance sheets of these banks looked huge as a multiple of member state 
GDP: in 2011, the ratio of total assets to domestic GDP was 84.8% for Deutsche Bank, 99.8% for BNP 
Paribas and 118.2% for Santander (Liikanen et al. 2012, 39). Post-crisis, euro area member states faced 
a stark choice between ‘cutting banks down to size’ through enacting bank structural reform, which 
would have reduced the power of banks, and between further pushing financial market integration by 
creating a banking and capital markets union. Instead of cutting banks down to size, banking union 
meant deeper integration of European financial markets and thus served the interests of large European 
banks. As a result, the size of a bank’s balance sheet would not be measured in terms of its home 
country’s GDP, but would be compared to the pooled resources of the eurozone member states. Large 
banks can as a result operate completely insulated from the legal, political, and fiscal environment of 
their home countries – and potentially dangerous doom loops – while at the same time the European 
taxpayer backs up their balance sheets. 
The 2012 Spanish Crisis and the Franco-German Banking Coalition 
Liberal intergovernmental accounts of the eurozone crisis typically stress the Spanish crisis of the 
summer of 2012 as the critical juncture that led Germany to recalculate its preferences and opened the 
way for a European Council agreement on the banking union (Krampf 2014; Schimmelfennig 2015; 
Glöckler, Lindner, and Salines 2017). According to this narrative, as the crisis threatened to tear the 
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eurozone apart, Germany and France altered their preferences because Spain was ‘too big to fail’, and 
German and French banks were highly exposed to Spanish and Italian banks (Krampf 2014). The direct 
recapitalization of Spanish banks via the ESM could occur under the condition that national regulatory 
forbearance would be eliminated in the future through the supranationalization of banking supervision 
(Glöckler, Lindner, and Salines 2017). At the European Council in June 2012, euro area countries 
confirmed that they would move forward with the banking union project. Shortly thereafter on July 26th, 
ECB President Draghi spoke the infamous words ‘whatever it takes,’ which then had a game-changing 
impact on the course of the crisis (Van Rompuy 2014).  
The explanation for the preference shift advanced in this article is compatible with standard accounts 
rooted in liberal intergovernmental reasoning.  We argue that the Spanish banking crisis had political 
reverberations in Germany and France. Namely, it decided the ‘battle of the German banks’ over 
banking union in favor of the position held by the large cross-border banks. Similarly, the French 
government that had been reluctant to fully embrace the banking union (Epstein and Rhodes 2016, 430; 
Epstein 2014a; Schild 2018) aligned itself with the interests of its highly concentrated banking sector 
that consists of a number of ‘too big to fail’ banks. 
The French reversal on centralizing EU-level supervision was driven by the large financial 
conglomerates represented by the French Banking Federation (FBF). French banks are among the most 
internationalized entities and stood to gain from the competitive advantage and regulatory savings (Tibi 
2016, 79). In addition, the troubles in the Spanish banking sector shifted market scrutiny towards 
France’s fragile public finances. With rating agencies threatening to downgrade French bonds, the 
government faced strong incentives to swiftly regain market confidence and endorse a fully-fledged 
banking union, including direct bank recapitalizations. The ironclad ties among public and private actors 
in the French financial establishment - best described as an ‘informal consortium’ (Jabko and Massoc 
2012, 566) – helped to convince the government that a European banking union was in its interest. 
Ultimately, France was at the forefront of the banking union advocates strongly supporting a fully-
fledged banking union based on a coherent position formed by its ‘too big to fail’ banks. 
In the German banking sector, a long-standing split frequently rendered the German government’s 
negotiation position ambivalent (Lütz 2005). This split was evident in the financial governance reforms 
triggered by the 2008 Financial Crisis. ‘The large German commercial banks believed that there was 
no long-term alternative to a European supranational supervisory authority, at least for cross-border 
institutions. […] By contrast the LB [Landesbanks], savings banks and co-operatives were more 
reluctant to accept a single European supervisor, although they softened their previously strong 
opposition’ (Buckley and Howarth 2010, 126). Ultimately, Germany’s endorsement of the de Larosière 
reforms was contingent on the UK’s guaranteed veto of any European banking supervisor (Buckley and 
Howarth 2010, 128). The two financial sector poles in Germany were also pulling in entirely different 
directions during the banking union negotiations (Hennessy 2014). 
However, prior to June 2012 the position of the German cooperative and savings banks – which are 
closely tied to local and regional politicians in Germany through instrumental power – had proved 
politically decisive. In the case of the banking union, large private banks came to dominate the discourse, 
aided by their structural power and the unfolding events in Spain at the height of the eurozone crisis. A 
particularly potent aspect of their structural power lay in their capacity to refinance the sovereign by 
holding large amounts of domestic bonds on their balance sheets. This then additionally supported the 
change in Germany’s position regarding the question whether to go ahead with the SSM or to maintain 
the status quo. In other words, theoretical accounts that derive national preferences simply from the 
dominant interest coalition can be misleading, because interest coalitions are not stable over time. Intra-
sectoral alliances can break down, which is what happened in the case of the German banks.  
At the beginning of the banking union process, there was an alliance of convenience between the 
large banks, which wanted elements of banking union to go forward, and the savings and co-operative 
banks, which wanted to defeat the proposal of a European deposit insurance guarantee scheme (German 
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Banking Industry Committee 2012). From the large bank perspective, the intra-sectoral alliance had to 
remain stable – at least temporarily – in order to persuade the national government to follow through 
and create a banking union. Once this was achieved and the exit option for large banks had been created 
– through the adoption of the SSM and the SRM – the incentives to cooperate ceased to exist, and the 
strategic intra-sectoral alliance of German banks split. The incentives for large private banks to support 
the cooperative and savings banks in their endeavor to prevent a single European deposit insurance had 
vanished, and those large banks reacted accordingly.  
As a result, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken were on the defensive, having to fend off attacks by 
Deutsche Bank, which invoked the Spanish cajas analogy and the case of Bankia, formed from the 
fusion of seven cajas in 2010, to make its case for a broad supervision coverage (Wilson 2012; Mallet 
and Johnson 2012; Fahrenschon 2012; German Savings Banks Association 2012). The Spanish savings 
banks played a pivotal role in fueling a devastating housing bubble that brought Spain to the brink of 
default, whereas Santander and BBVA emerged unscathed from the crisis due to their internationally 
diversified assets (Otero-Iglesias, Royo, and Steinberg 2016, 32). Like their German counterparts, the 
cajas maintained strong political ties to local politicians and were deemed to be systemically 
unimportant until they collapsed. Their demise and the sovereign-bank nexus put Santander and BBVA 
in the driving seat to determine the Spanish government’s position on banking union. The former head 
of Deutsche, Jürgen Fitschen, pressed the case in public shortly before the German decision (Taylor and 
Gould 2012): 
‘Fitschen said it was illusory to believe problems could be avoided by monitoring only big banks 
like Deutsche, noting that Bankia had become a national problem for Spain and the broader euro 
zone, though it was not considered systemically important by international regulators. “No one had 
Bankia on the list to trigger a crisis,” he said…. Fitschen rejected the argument of smaller German 
savings and cooperative banks, which want to continue to be regulated at a national level. “If we in 
Germany argue that we are different, we invite other countries to also argue for exemptions,” he 
said.’ 
The position of Germany nicely emphasizes a fundamental analytical point for understanding banking 
union politics: national governments have been torn between the competing interests of their large and 
small banks. The latter pulled towards banking nationalism, while the former pushed for banking 
Europeanism. Does the German government protect the interests of Deutsche Bank or of the 
Sparkassen? The answer of the German chancellor would of course be ‘both.’ Yet the diverging interests 
and power resources of Germany’s banking sector would render this stance increasingly difficult as the 
banks pushed the government in opposite directions. In France, large systemically-important banks 
received a boost to their structural power through the sovereign-bank nexus that was starting to affect 
France’s sovereign bond ratings. In contrast to Germany, the French government had to deal with a less 
fragmented coalition of influential cross-border banks, which led to a more coherent position of all 
aspects of the banking union. 
Banking Union’s Premature Death in Veneto? 
The resolution of the Spanish Banco Popular and of two smaller Italian lenders, Veneto Banca and Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza (BPVI), provided a first credibility test for the European Banking Union. A mixed 
picture has emerged from these bank closures. While some pundits argued that the banking union’s 
credibility has been severely damaged because loopholes in the BRRD were exploited to avoid a fully-
fledged bail-in (Reichlin 2017), others are more optimistic, highlighting the progress that has been 
achieved compared to the pre-banking union era (Sandbu 2017; Merler 2017). Despite the use of Italian 
taxpayers’ money to smoothen the economic impact of the failure of Veneto Banca and BPVI, 
shareholders and junior debt were subject to bail-in.  
In the case of Veneto Banca and BPVI, toxic assets were separated from good ones, with Italian 
taxpayers indirectly shouldering a substantial part of the burden through the private sector-funded 
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Atlante bailout fund. Intesa Sanpaolo snatched up the high quality assets and the retail business of these 
banks at a deep discount of a symbolic €1. Prior to agreeing to the deal, Italy’s second biggest bank had 
secured conditions that would insulate it from any negative contagion of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
on its balance sheet. For that purpose, the Italian state offered Intesa a sweetener of €12 billion in 
guarantees against any potential losses from the takeover on top of a €4.8 billon cash injection to shore 
up its capital ratio and to fund restructuring operations.  
Contrary to the spirit of the BRRD, the bailout controversially allowed senior creditors to get away 
scot-free. The SRB’s decision that the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) would not be involved in the 
resolution allowed the Italian government to evade the more stringent bail-in rules enshrined in the 
BRRD. Even though the Italian government’s first-best solution – a precautionary re-capitalization – 
was not feasible due to the lack of private sector willingness to contribute funds, Prime Minister 
Gentiloni’s interim government avoided the full ‘bail-in cascade’ that would have resulted in a bail-in 
of 8% of eligible liabilities, including senior bondholders and deposits above €100,000.  
At the Euro Area Summit in the summer of 2012, Europe’s leaders declared that it was of paramount 
importance ‘to break the link between banks and their sovereign.’ The Venetian saga demonstrates that, 
at least in Italy, the sovereign-bank nexus is alive and well. If push comes to shove, the government has 
to step in and mobilize the necessary resources. Private sector involvement (PSI) can quickly run into a 
political quicksand that will swallow the economic rationale behind it, leaving no trace in the eventual 
policy solution. Italian banks have mis-sold large amounts of junior debt to retail depositors that have 
become (often unknowingly) subject to the new bail-in framework. These retail depositors are also 
voters. Any additional liquidation that would burn this constituency financially would fuel the Italian 
populist backlash. In order to respect the state aid rules and to avoid angering voters, the Italian 
government established a scheme that would allow holders of subordinated debts to receive 
reimbursements under certain restrictive conditions. 
The first test cases of the European banking union provide confirmatory evidence for our claim that 
large banks had a strategic interest in the new regulatory framework and will continue to benefit from 
it. The acquisition of Banco Popular turned Santander, one of the most-outspoken advocates of banking 
union, into Spain’s largest bank with an overall market share of approximately 20 percent. It also 
bolstered its competitive position in the Portuguese banking sector. The liquidation of Veneto Banca 
and BPVI and the ensuing take-over of their good assets and retail business by Intesa Sanpaolo will 
likewise bolster its market share in Italy. In all cases, the take-overs will lead to a higher concentration 
in the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese banking sectors, to the benefit of the largest banks. 
Conclusion 
The effects of the banking union on the playing field can already be felt. It has ratcheted up the pressure 
on Europe’s banks to finally come to terms with their ‘legacy assets.’ At the same time, it has further 
limited, but not fully eliminated, national policy-makers’ wiggle room for forbearance. National 
champions (Santander in Spain and Intesa in Italy) are snatching up high quality assets of their struggling 
rivals at bargain prices and, thereby, further increase their structural power. Thus far, the promise to 
break the sovereign-bank nexus has not been fulfilled.  
Many of the most compelling theoretical accounts of the Single Market Act and European Monetary 
Union have stressed the causal primacy of the governments of the most powerful countries that chose 
to create new supranational institutions to govern a single market and single currency. As a way of 
modelling the underlying politics of inter-state negotiation in the EU, which once again came into play 
in the birth of the European banking union, this approach has much to recommend it. The weak point of 
such analysis has long been its static portrayal of the character of domestic interest coalitions that drive 
policy change. Our discussion of the politics of banking union has emphasized the way in which banking 
interests have diverged between small and large banks, and the corresponding change in how those 
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banks exercise political influence, between instrumental and structural power. Incorporating such 
insights about how domestic coalitions evolve over time can add to the dynamic capacity of interest-
based accounts to explain the changing institutional architecture in Europe and beyond. 
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